Introduction
Taxation enables governments to gain effective political power. Understanding political decisions in the public sector thus requires knowledge about the power to tax of different government tiers and the impact of the allocation of taxing powers on government finances. Following Winer (1988, 1997) , tax systems are the outcome of an interaction between rational (private and public) agents who maximize their utility in a framework of collective decision making. In this framework, the fiscal behavior of a government is basically constraint by exit and voice (Hirschman 1970) . Voice in the public sector can be exerted by democratic decision-making procedures, like competitive elections, popular referendums or voter initiatives, while exit requires the possibility of citizens migrate and hence vote by feet.
The literature on the impact of electoral competition as an investigation of the voice mechanism starts with the median voter model explaining the observable tax system under majority rule (Romer 1975 , Roberts 1977 , Meltzer and Richard 1981 ). An extension to this literature is discussed by Matsusaka (1995) and Feld and Matsusaka (2002) . They distinguish between revenue systems in direct vs. representative democratic systems and provide empirical evidence that in jurisdictions with fiscal referendums government finances rely more on user charges than on tax revenues and that tax revenues are lower in a direct democracy compared to a representative democratic system. A related approach focuses on the impact of federalism on government behavior as an investigation of the exit mechanism (Oates 1972 , 1985 , Brennan and Buchanan 1977 , 1978 , 1980 . As argued by Brennan and Buchanan, the government is able to behave like a revenue maximizing monopoly called a Leviathan. In a centralized system where only the federal level possesses taxing powers, it is more difficult to restrict such Leviathan behavior than in a strongly decentralized system with considerable powers of state and local governments. If different units of government have to share their tax base, the threat of migration imposes a serious restriction on government behavior. 1. Quoted according to Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 168) 2. The problem of vertical fiscal externalities that might occur in a multi-level federalism is not discussed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) or Oates (1972) . A theoretical analysis of vertical fiscal externalities can be found in Wrede (1996) or Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) .
In the empirical literature on the relationship between government decentralization and go vernment size, whether and how fiscal decentralization affects government size is still not clarified. In particular the potential transmission channels through which decentralization reduces public sector size are not investigated explicitly. The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically whether a decentralization of the power to tax to sub-federal jurisdictions has an impact on the size and structure of government revenue of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998.
The main emphasis is on the different mechanisms by which revenue decentralization might influence the size of the public sector. We distinguish tax competition, tax exporting and fragmentation as three potential transmission mechanisms that affect government size. The residual impact of decentralization is interpreted as evidence for laboratory federalism (Oates 1999) . Switzerland is particularly suited for such a test because it provides unique data of subfederal governments that have extensive autonomy in choosing tax instruments including also quantitatively important and progressive taxes on income and property.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The different transmission channels by which fiscal federalism affects government size are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 surveys the empirical literature on the impact of fiscal federalism on the size and scope of government revenue. In Section 4, the Swiss tax system is explained in order to demonstrate the importance of sub-federal Swiss taxing powers. Data and the specification of our empirical model appear in Section 5 while Section 6 discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
Transmission Channels of Fiscal Federalism on the Size of Government
According to Brennan and Buchanan, emigration imposes a serious restriction on the ability of governments to exploit tax bases. If emigration is possible at low cost, tax bases can avoid excessive taxation by leaving the jurisdiction that levies taxes. In their decentralization hypothesis Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 185) conclude: "total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized". A similar interpretation of fiscal federalism is provided by Oates (1972) . He argues that political agents have a better knowledge of the preferences of their constituency if the fiscal power is decentralized, such that the provision of public goods can be tailored more efficiently to their needs. The Wicksellian (1896) connection of spending and taxing decisions is much tighter on the local than on the federal level. 3 According to Oates (1972) the Wicksellian connection favors a smaller size of government. On the other hand, as Oates (1985) mentions, if local governments have more information about the preferences of citizens than central governments and, therefore, public services can be better tailored to the needs of voters, this might increase their demand for public spending leading to a larger share of government. 4 In a somewhat different analysis, Tabellini (1994, 2000) theoretically show the importance of decentralization in restricting government discretion to exploit the fiscal commons. Wildasin (1997) follows a similar line of thought by concluding that fiscal indiscipline of sub-federal governments as a result of bail-outs by the central government is of minor relevance in a fragmented federalism where sub-federal units are not considered as being too big to fail.
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Despite the emphasis on exit as a disciplinary device, it is not clear which mechanism is supposed to lead to a smaller government sector in the first place. Additionally to the decentralization hypothesis, Brennan and Buchanan (1977 , 1978 , 1980 hence develop a fragmentation hypothesis: The competitive impact of fiscal federalism depends on the number of possible alternative jurisdictions that are available for voters and firms and the transaction costs that migrations induce. They argue: "the potential for fiscal exploitation varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory" (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 185) . In a theoretical analysis, Epple and Zelenitz (1981) show, that with increasing numbers of jurisdictional units, the scope for taxation diminishes although it does not disappear entirely. Of course, decentralization and fragmentation could also lead to inefficiencies since increasing returns to scale in the consumption of public goods can be exploited to a lesser extent (Sinn 1997 (Sinn , 2003 . The result might be a larger public sector because economies of scale are not exploited and the provision of public services becomes more inefficient.
A second argument for the dampening impact of decentralization on government size stems from the tax competition literature, and could be called the tax competition hypothesis (see Wilson 1999 for a survey). In particular with respect to public revenue, a more intense tax competition will lead to lower tax rates of the mobile higher income recipients and thus to lower tax revenue. Mobile taxpayers move to jurisdictions with -ceteris paribus -lower tax rates. The lower the mobility costs the higher the pressure for a jurisdiction will be to compete 4. Oates (1985, p. 749) refers to the American economic historian Wallis claiming that this hypothesis is based on observations from American history.
5. Qian and Roland (1998) study two effects of federalism: First, a 'competition effect' which increases the opportunity costs of bail-outs and serves as a commitment device for the government under factor mobility; second, a 'checks and balance effect' which serves as a hard budget constraint. Rodden (2002) shows that intergovernmental grants induce fiscal indiscipline of sub-federal governments through bail-out.
with other jurisdictions by lowering tax rates as well. The result is a smaller government sector. In contrast to the Leviathan model which has revenue maximizing governments by assumption, the tax competition literature evaluates such a government as inefficiently small however, because the go vernment is supposed to do 'what it ought to' (Sinn 1997 While Oates (1972) emphasizes the advantage of a decentralized government with respect to preference costs of centralized provision of public services, Oates (1999) more strongly underlines the role of laboratory federalism. A decentralized competitive government structure allows for an experimentation of new public policies without doing too much harm if they fail. Successful government policies in one jurisdiction are imitated and adapted by other jurisdictions at the same, lower or higher government level. Federalism then becomes a discovery procedure for new public solutions (Schnellenbach 2003) . Weingast (1995) argues that the discovery mechanism of government decentralization tends to promote policies that are closer to market solutions. The author therefore speaks of market-preserving federalism and hypothesizes a smaller government sector. The market-preserving role of fiscal federalism as a means to reduce the public sector could thus be called the discovery hypothesis.
Review on the Empirical Literature
Numerous researchers have been concerned with the impact of fiscal federalism on the size of government. The results are however inconclusive and, moreover, the different transmission channels are not empirically distinguished yet. Oates (1972, p. 209-213) Nelson (1987) criticizes the proxy for decentralization used by Oates (1985) . He argues that in
Oates' data set nearly one third of all governments are special districts. Most of them only provide one single public service like for example cemetery services and one-third of them have no taxing powers (Nelson, 1987, p. 199) . Jurisdictions with limited governmental functions and taxing powers are not directly comparable with general-purpose governments.
Therefore, Nelson (1987) distinguishes between data drawn from general-purpose and singlepurpose jurisdictions of 48 US states for the fiscal year 1977. His results indicate a fairly robust support for the fragmentation hypothesis for general-purpose jurisdictions but not for single-purpose jurisdictions. Much the same can be concluded from the study by Eberts and Gronberg (1988) who use data from the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) level.
In an empirical investigation of the Olson (1982) hypothesis of economic sclerosis as a result of the time length of a politically stable environment, Wallis and Oates (1988b) provide evidence in a panel analysis from selected years between 1902 to 1982 (432 observations) that fiscal concentration is positively related to the size of state and local go vernments. In a crosssection regression among 3022 counties, Zax (1989) provides evidence in favor of both the fragmentation and decentralization hypotheses using data from 1982. In addition, Raimondo (1989) investigates the effect of federalism on specific spending categories, suggesting that the decentralization hypothesis may hold for some public services but not for others. Another objection to the validity of these empirical findings is mentioned by Marlow (1988) and Marlow (1990, 1991 Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . It could simply mean a shift of federal public spending from those states with a more pronounced federal structure to those with a less pronounced one, without affecting the total level. Thus, the really interesting question whether the government size of the US would be larger if it had a less pronounced federal fiscal structure remains unanswered. The results do neither support, nor contradict the proposition that countries with a federal fiscal structure have -ceteris paribus -a smaller size of the public sector.
To test the decentralization hypothesis, a cross-country analysis needs to be performed (Kirchgässner 2002b (2000) find support for the expenditure cutting effect of federalism for some 20 OECD countries. In the latter cases the samples are, however, rather small.
Because the measure of decentralization used by Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000) is only that part of local government spending which is entirely financed by local taxes (in relation to total government spending), they nevertheless capture the degree of local fiscal independence better than earlier studies. The above-mentioned results by Jin and Zou (2002) The fiscal autonomy of municipalities varies considerably from canton to canton, but even in rather centralized cantons communes are not forced to keep tax rates on a certain level. Therefore, tax burdens vary even more among Swiss municipalities than among cantons. raises a tax on income of individuals and corporations in addition to the cantons. Presently, the federal income tax covers about 60% of total federal revenue. The tax rates for the income tax on the central level are explicitly enumerated in the constitution. Currently, the statutory maximum average rate amounts for 11.5% with a maximum marginal rate of 13.2%. As can be seen from Table 3 , the distribution of revenue and expenditure among the three layers of government changed considerably over time. Contrary to the increase in many other countries, the share of the central government in total government expenditure and revenue even decreased by about 10 percentage points within the last fifty years. Today, the financial importance of the sub-federal governments accounts for nearly 70% of all financial flows of the total government. All in all, with considerable tax autonomy, including progressive income and property (wealth) taxes, the Swiss sub-federal governments constitute a unique data base to investigate the effect of federalism on the size of government on the European continent. Though many other federalist countries in Europe have the power to spend, they have rather limited power to tax which in principle implies that analyzing the effect of fiscal federalism on the size of go vernment is biased in these countries, at best.
Data and Empirical Spe cification
In order to test the empirical relevance of federalism on the size of government for the Swiss case, we first propose the following model: Meltzer and Richard (1981) , it could be hypothesized that the lower is median as compared to average income the higher the pressure to exploit the richer minority by the poorer majority in a democracy. The ratio of urban population in a canton reflects the effect of population density on fiscal policy decisions of governments. The population variable takes economies of scale into account: Can larger cantons benefit from economies of scale in order to reach a lower level of public expenditures? We thus follow the suggestions by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) for US states or Pommerehne and Frey (1976) for Swiss municipalities. A negative sign of the coefficients of these variables indicates that the larger the population the lower the level of the endogenous fiscal variables. We also include the cantonal unemployment rate and a German language dummy as controls. The impact of democracy is incorporated by an index for the extent to which direct democracy is established on the cantonal level (for a description of the Index, c.f. Stutzer and Frey (2000) and Trechsel and Serdült (1999) ).
According to previous empirical work (c.f. Section 3), we expect a revenue cutting effect by the instruments of direct democracy. In addition, a variable incorporating budget rules on the cantonal level is included. They can be seen as a supplementary instrument to constrain the taxing power of policymakers (Schaltegger, 2002) . We also include a coalition variable in order to empirically evaluate the effect of broad based coalition governments on the exploit a-tion of the budget as a fiscal commons. The argument that the tax base represents a fiscal commons that will be exploited by too many spending ministers is developed by Roubini und Sachs (1989) , Edin und Ohlsson (1991) , Corsetti und Roubini (1992) , de Haan und Sturm (1997), Kontopoulos und Perotti (1999) , Velasco (1999) or Volkerink and de Haan (2001) . , 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 * According to the definition of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration, Total tax revenue are the sum of income and property taxes and expenditure taxes.
**According to the definition of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration, income and property taxes are the sum of income, property, profit, capital, land, property gain, property change and inheritance taxes.
The focus of the analysis is on the impact of federalism on the size of government which is tested by five different variables: revenue decentralization, fragmentation, tax competition, tax exporting and grants. Decentralization as the local fiscal autonomy is proxied by the ratio of local revenue on the aggregated state and local revenue. The fragmentation variable is constructed by the number of communes in a canton divided by population. In both cases, a negative impact on government revenue is expected. Tax competition is measured by the weighted average of the competing cantons' tax burden in the highest income tax bracket of a million Swiss francs annual taxable income. The competing cantons are all cantons except the one of consideration, weighted by the inverse of the distance (see Feld and Reulier, 2002 for a discussion of empirical studies). This variable indicates that the higher the average tax burden of the other cantons, the lower the pressure of tax competition on the cantonal and local tax authorities and the higher is tax revenue. Tax exporting is measured by the number of tourist nights per capita. Tax exporting possibilities relax the pressure that exit and voice exert on fiscal authorities. Tax exporting thus leads to higher tax revenue. Using this variable, we primarily capture tax exporting by the burden tourists bear especially by paying tourist fees. On the other hand, the attractiveness of a canton which is reflected in the number of tourist nights per capita might also allow for higher taxation of property owners. Finally, grants change the incentive structure for policymakers as argued in Section 2 and relax the pressure from migration to a government that overtaxes or overspends.
The analysis is performed for the revenue categories in Table 4 so that for every revenue category a corresponding variable for decentralization is constructed. With respect to the revenue structure it can be particularly expected that tax competition and tax exporting affect tax revenue categories in the predicted way instead of user charge revenue. The quantitative impact of these two variables can be expected to be the larger the more intense tax competition or the more easily taxes can be exported. An intensive tax competition might as well induce fiscal authorities to finance spending more strongly by user charges such that an increase of the average of other cantons' tax burden leads to less regard of the benefit principle.
As indicated above, a revenue restricting impact of fiscal decentralization may be the result of many different influences, among them fragmentation, tax competition and tax exporting.
These three mechanisms are explicitly controlled for by the respective variables in the model.
If decentralization still exerts a significant effect after the introduction of these three variables, it might well be the result of political economy influences. A decentralized competitive government structure allows for an experimentation of new public policies such that federalism works as a discovery procedure. Although other influences might be hiding in the decentralization variable, we propose that it predominantly captures the discovery hypothesis.
In order to test the hypotheses, the focus of the empirical analysis is on the aggregated state and local level. The analysis uses yearly data from 1980 to 1998 deflated to the year 1980.
The subscript i = 1, ..., 26 indicates cantons and t = 1980, ..., 1998 indexes years (for data description, data source and descriptive statistics, cf. Appendix A). The empirical analysis is performed using a pooled cross-section time-series model. We follow Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) , who argue that despite the panel structure of the data the inclusion of fixed effects in the cross-section domain is inappropriate because the institutional variables reflecting the extent of federalism vary only very little or remain constant over time in a few cantons. Accordingly, cantonal intercepts do not make sense as the captured impact on fiscal outcomes is either solely driven by the time variation or in case of time invariant variables, fixed effects are likely to hide the effect of institutional variables and render them insignificant. The consistency of OLS-estimates depends on the exogeneity of the regressands. In order to tackle the problem of possible endogeneity of the decentralization variable, we use an instrumental variable technique with lags t-1 of the original decentralization as well as spatial lags of all regressands as instruments for the tax competition variable. Finally, year effects to circumvent time dependency are included and the standard errors are corrected by the clustering method.
Results
The test strategy is first estimating the model with the decentralization and grants variables and second, additionally including the three specific mechanisms by which federalism affects government size. The overall results in Table 5 indicate that fiscally more decentralized cantons have smaller governments measured by public revenue as predicted by the decentralization hypothesis. This is true for total government revenue and for tax revenue but not for user charges. Looking at the tax revenue categories, some interesting differences can be distinguished as well. Taxes on income are significantly reduced under revenue decentralization whereas taxes on property and wealth are not touched by differences in the assignment of taxes between the cantonal and the communal level. Taxes on income and property as a whole are negatively affected by fiscal decentralization as well. Interestingly, decentralizing corporate taxes leads to less capital taxes while taxes on profits are not significantly reduced. All in all, the obtained results show that fiscal decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue in Switzerland as predicted by Oates (1972) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) .
Introducing fragmentation, tax competition and tax exporting, the effect of fiscal decentralization is reduced in magnitude but exhibits the same structure of effects. Still there is no significant impact of revenue decentralization on revenue from user charges, on property and profit tax revenue. The statistical significances of the decentralization impacts are increased however such that the estimated effects appear to be more precisely estimated. Controlling for fragmentation, tax exporting and competition, the remaining effect of decentralization mainly appears to capture political economy effects as the one summarized in the discovery hypothesis. Decentralized decision-making keeps government revenue low. The fragmentation hypothesis does not seem to be relevant in the Swiss case since the estimation results exhibit insignificant results. Only with respect to the tax structure two notable effects can be found:
Tax revenue from income taxes is negatively affected by fragmentation though only marginally significant while capital tax revenue is significantly positively influenced. Government size stands for state and local revenues per capita. t-values are given in parentheses. All regressions contain 19 year-dummies whose coefficients are not reported. ***,** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is a test on the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals. Instruments: all regressands and lagged t-1 values of the decentralization variable. Spatial lags of all regressands but decentralization, tax competition, tax exporting and fragmentation. General revenue: Dummy for Appenzell a.Rh. in year 1996 included for total revenue equation, since this canton had exceptional revenue at that year when they sold their cantonal bank to the UBS.
The tax competition variable exhibits the expected positive sign indicating that a higher ave rage tax burden of competing cantons relaxes the competitive pressure on cantonal fiscal authorities. Tax competition does however not have a statistically significant effect on user charges and only a marginally significant impact on tax revenue on the 10 percent level.
Looking at the tax structure, it becomes obvious that tax competition is the most restrictive in the case of income and property (wealth) tax revenues, but does not have any effect on profit and capital tax revenues. Hence the tax competition hypothesis cannot be rejected according to these results. Tax exporting on the other hand has a strong influence on several revenue categories. Tax exporting possibilities increase government revenue in the case of tax revenue, user charges and taxes on income and property in general. From single tax revenue components, property and capital taxes appear to be positively affected while income and profits taxes are not. These results are in line with the hypotheses formulated above. In the case of user charges, exporting of financial burden to tourists is possible in a similar fashion as in the case of indirect taxes. Hence, the competitive pressure on cantonal governments is reduced and revenue from user charges increases. On the other hand, cantons that are attractive to tourists enable the government to exploit property and capital owners to a larger extent. The attractiveness of the area is positively capitalized in property (wealth) and capital taxes.
The grants variable is positive and significant for general revenue, but negative for tax revenue. This is reasonable since grants are one source of income for the sub-national governments, enabling them to reduce the tax burden for their constituency without being forced to reduce government spending as well. This strategy is especially attractive for politicians in the case of income and property as well as profit taxes.
Thus, the effect of federalism on the size of government in Switzerland stems from decentralization and the fiscal autonomy of sub-federal governments in the possibility of deciding about tax instruments on their own and the resulting tax competition, but not from the competitive pressure of having many governmental units. Tax competition is effectively restric ting the government in the case of income and property (wealth) taxes. Tax exporting partly compensates the revenue reducing effect of tax competition and leads to higher tax revenue, but does not suffice to compensate the revenue restriction imposed by tax competition with respect to total revenue. Though fragmentation empirically has not proven to be a significant determinant explaining the size of government revenue, it has to be noted that it is to some extent a precondition for fiscal decentralization. Thus, it might be that fragmentation has an indirect effect on the size of government revenue. The impact of decentralization on govern-ment size may additionally stem from the cost saving decentralized experimentation of new government policies.
Looking at the democracy variable, we obtain similar results as for the decentralization variable. The stronger popular rights in a canton the smaller the revenue burden voters have to bear. In contrast to decentralization, direct popular rights mainly reduce income and property (wealth) taxes but not profit taxes. The overall results are in line with those reported by Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) and Feld and Matsusaka (2002) . Interestingly, budget rules have essentially no effect on state and local tax revenues in Switzerland. However, as shown by Schaltegger (2002) , statutory requirements in the cantons reduce cantonal spending as well as budget deficits. As can be seen by the results in Table 5 , the hypothesis of broad based coalition governments that tend to exploit the fiscal resources finds support for total government revenue. This finding is consistent with those found by Volkerink and de Haan (2001) for OECD-countries. For tax revenue we cannot find support for the coalition hypothesis with respect to the case of Swiss sub-federal governments implying that broad based coalition go vernments tend to expand government revenue by raising user charges.
Wagner's Law becomes confirmed for the revenue structure as a whole by the positive and significant impact of cantonal income on the revenue measures. User charges are however not correlated with income. The homogeneity of income distribution and unemployment have no effect on the size of the government. The results for the variable population are inconclusive but the share of urban population in a canton has a positive and significant impact on the whole revenue structure implying possible agglomeration effects in urban areas which promote economic activity and thus favor higher government revenue. Unemployment does not have a significant effect of cantonal revenue. The language variable is only significant in the case of user charges and property taxes.
As we observe different effects of federalism on the size of tax revenue as compared to the size of user charges, a natural question occurs in this context: What is the effect of federalism on the distribution between taxes and user charges? It could be argued that decentralization strengthens the benefit principle where consumers are more likely to be confronted with ma rginal costs of their decisions (Wicksell, 1896) . Thus, decentralization might favor governments to rely more on user charges and less on taxes. If this were true, decentralization should have a negative effect on the ratio of tax revenue on total revenue. In order to conduct a fo rmal test we regress log-odds of the tax revenue ratio on the regressands of equation (1). As can be seen from Table 6 , decentralization in fact favors a smaller ratio of tax revenue on total government revenue. Thus, the hypothesis, that decentralization strengthens the benefit principle between government spending and government revenue cannot be rejected according to the results obtained for the Swiss state and local level. It also remains significantly negative if the three transmission mechanisms, fragmentation, tax competition and tax exporting, are included in the regression. From the specific mechanisms only tax competition has a significant impact. The more favorable the position of a canton is in the tax competition with other cantons the more the canton relies on taxes instead of user charges. The fragmentation and tax exporting variables have only a weak explanatory power for the tax share of total government revenue. Interestingly, direct democracy has the same effect as decentralization in the presented results which supports findings by Feld and Matsusaka (2002) .
All in all, the results for the Swiss federalism indicate that revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue. This especially holds for tax revenue but not for user charges. Moreover, decentralization favors a shift of revenue instruments of the government from taxes to user charges. Tax competition tends to restrict the taxation of income and property while tax exporting relaxes the pressure on fiscal authorities. The remaining negative effect of decentralization on government revenue is conjectured to be due to political economy reasons.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to test the effect of federalism on the size of government. As a survey on the empirical literature shows, up to now many authors have been concerned with the evaluation of the validity of the Leviathan-hypothesis arguing that constitutional restrictions like federalism strengthen political competition and therefore lead to a smaller size of government. The overall results are not conclusive even though supportive studies have recently gained more attention. However, most studies are performed in a US context. This study uses data from Switzerland to evaluate the question of federalism and its impact on the size of government. Swiss federalism allows for a far reaching fiscal autonomy on the revenue side of the budget for sub-national governments and therefore represents a unique data base to investigate the Leviathan-hypothesis within Europe. The present work suggests that federalism measured by revenue decentralization has a strong revenue cutting effect. This is true for general revenue for cantons and municipalities as well as for most revenue catego-
ries. An interesting exception concerns user charges. Decentralization appears to restrict the government's taxing abilities mainly by tax competition and political economy mechanisms.
Tax exporting only partially reduces the pressure on the fisc. A natural question that emerges in this context is whether federalism would strengthen the benefit principle of government spending and revenue. Thus, we test the impact of federalism on the ratio of tax revenue from total government revenue as well. The results show that decentralization in fact leads to a sig-nificant smaller ratio of tax revenue on total government revenue implying that user charges play a more prominent role in financing government activity in a competitive federalism. Urban population Proportion of communes having more than 10'000 inhabitants.
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Democracy Index designed to reflect the extent of direct democratic participation possibilities within a range between 1 (lo west) and 6 (highest degree).
Own calculations for an index proposed by Stutzer and Frey (2000) on the basis of data from Trechsel and Serdült (1999) .
Grants
Real net transfer payments from the central government to the cantonal governments per capita.
Own calculations on the basis of Swiss Federal Finance Administration. Own calculations on the basis of Stauffer (2001) 
